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ABSTRACT
Empirical evidence suggests that networks of personal relations are important in
the micro dynamics of labor markets: even in modern capitalistic economies a
high share of jobs are ﬁlled by social referrals. This paper aims at shedding light
on an apparent puzzle concerning the relationship between the use of informal
contacts and wages. First, the paper argues that economic perspectives con-
cerning such relationship might beneﬁt from considering important diﬀerences in
the nature of social ties. Second, a formal model which considers two distinct
informal contacts dubbed ”family” and ”professional” is proposed. The model
predicts that while the use of the former type is likely to have a negative impact
on wages, the opposite is true for the latter. Third, a relatively unexploited Ital-
ian data set is used to show that distinct ties have diﬀerent properties and are
likely to be used by diﬀerent individuals. Finally, the paper concentrates on the
relation between informal contacts and wages, obtaining results consistent with
the foregoing theoretical insights.
JEL Classiﬁcation: A14, J31, J41, Z13.
Keywords: Labor Markets, Job Search, Social Networks.
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1. Introduction
At least since the inﬂuential work of Albert Rees (1966), economists acknowledge that
in the labor market demand and supply match in a distinctive mode. In particular, the
fact that a high share of jobs are ﬁlled through referrals or diﬀerent kinds of help provided
by acquaintances, friends and relatives reveals that information that actors have about one
another are largely embedded in their social networks. However, if one tries to go beyond
this simple statement sorting out, for instance, how the use of social contacts varies among
diﬀerent demographic groups, how its intensity changes along the business cycle, what is its
likely eﬀect on job quality and matching eﬃciency, how it is aﬀected by new matching tech-
nologies (e.g. internet based recruitment), the open questions overshadow the few tentative
answers.1
Aiming at improving the lack of knowledge concerning the importance of social referrals
in the labor market, this paper studies the relationship between the use of social ties and
wages. The issue is controversial in both economic and sociology literature (Granovetter
1995; Ioannides and Loury 2005). Social networks are often depicted as eﬀective channels to
convey information and, therefore, as an asset in labor matching quality (e.g. Holzer (1988)).
On the other hand, there is no clear-cut evidence on the ceteris paribus eﬀect of informal
contacts use on wage outcomes and distinct works have come to divergent conclusions.
Trying to provide an explanation for the international variation in wage diﬀerentials
between jobs found through formal and informal channels,2 Pellizzari (2004) argues that
heterogeneity in ﬁrms’ recruitment strategies is key in order to make sense of such variation.
1For discussions and progresses in the above issues see Ports (1993); Osberg (1993); Autor (2001), and
the recent survey by Ioannides and Loury (2005).
2The label ”informal channels” often encompasses both ”social referrals” and ”direct application”. In
this paper we use it as a perfect substitute of ”social referrals”.– 3 –
The present work provides a complementary explanation focussing on the multifaceted nature
of the social ties between the job seeker and the contact. Two distinct types of contacts are
identiﬁed, family and professional, which indicates respectively whether the referral has been
made by a relative or a non-relative having the same professional role of the job seeker. It
is shown that distinct contacts are likely to be used by diﬀerent would-be workers and lead
to diﬀerent wage outcomes.
Theoretically, we build on notions familiar to economists: social networks can be em-
ployed as screening and search devices in circumstances characterized by asymmetric in-
formation and high search costs. To put it in a nutshell, ﬁrst, employers do not observe
productive skills of potential employees before hiring them, but may use social referrals as
a screening mechanism. Second, in labor markets undermined by various sorts of frictions,
job seekers may exploit their social networks in order to locate vacancies without bearing
high search costs. Also motivated by the empirical focus of our study (i.e. individuals in the
early stage of their careers), we shall not model explicitly network formation, assuming that
actors take social structure as a given.
The empirical analysis focuses on university-to-job transition of Italian graduates and
obtains results consitent with the proposed model. The case is interesting for three basic
reasons. First, as showed in Table 1, if one compares the shares of college graduates who
use personal contacts across a selected sample of European countries, Italy ranks ﬁrst.3
Second, despite the low costs of higher education and the low level of formal barriers in
its access, Italian system seems characterized by a low level of intergenerational mobility
both in terms of occupational ladder and educational achievements (Checchi et al. 1999).
3Percentages are calculated using the data set built by a Project funded by the European Community
under the Targeted Socio-Economic Research (TSER) named ”Careers after Higher Education: a European
Research Study”. See http://www.uni-kassel.de/wz1/tseregs.htm for details.– 4 –
Table 1: Share of University Graduates Using Social Contacts











Notes: The relevant question asked in the survey was ”Which method was the most important one for getting your ﬁrst job after graduation?”.
We label the answer as ”social contacts” if the respondent answered ”I used personal connections/contacts (e.g. parents, relatives)”.
Source: Final report of ”Careers after Higher Education: a European Research Study”.
Details on the project and downloadable material can be found at http://www.uni-kassel.de/wz1/tseregs.htm.
A possible explanation for this puzzle might be the eventual ”conservative” use of social
networks. Third, analyzing the eﬀect of the use of social ties on wages of the overall Italian
labor force Pistaferri (1999), in contrast with most theoretical predictions, ﬁnds a negative
impact.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 critically reviews the literature on the
impact of the use of social contact on wages. Section 3 presents a model that encompasses
two distinct types of social networks—professional and family—and predicts that they have a
diﬀerent impact on wages. Section 4 describes the data set. Section 5 presents some evidence
concerning common characterics to individuals who get their job through referrals. Section 6
concentrates on the relatioship between distinct social contact use and wage. Section 7
discusses to what extent the correlations found between distinct social network use and wages
can be considered as causal. Further evidence concerning the implication of the model is
also provided. Section 8 concludes.– 5 –
2. Networks and wages: a critical review
Several empirical investigations have addressed the eﬃcacy of using social networks as a
job-search strategy. For example Holzer (1988) shows that checking with friends and relatives
is both the most popular and the most productive search method (conditional upon its use)
among unemployed youth.4 Subtle and interesting matters concern to which extent this
eﬃciency depends on individual endowments of social contacts and how aggregate welfare is
aﬀected if these endowments inﬂuence occupational choices (Bentolila et al. 2004).
A complementary issue concerns the eﬀect of the use of social networks on wages. The
conventional wisdom in the economic literature acknowledges that, given the inherent in-
formation asymmetries and imperfection in the labor market, information ﬂowing through
social networks helps employers and job seekers to reach better matches.
In his seminal paper Albert Rees (1966) set the stage arguing that the bulk of the
uncertainty in the labor market concerns the so-called intensive margin of search: contrary
to standardized commodities markets, in labor markets employers (employees) are typically
concerned with detailed information about a single potential applicant (a likely and suitable
oﬀer). Accordingly, employers typically either set very restrictive requisites on observables, or
exploit information ﬂowing through social contacts concerning non observable characteristics.
Relying on employee referrals, a special case of the latter strategy, is believed to perform
particularly well: ﬁrst, employees often care about the quality of someone who is likely to
become a colleague. Second, they are interested in disclosing accurate information, because
their own reputation may be at stake (Saloner 1985). Third, if people tend to refer others
similar to themselves, ﬁrms can exploit this information as an eﬀective screening device
4Similar results on the eﬀectiveness of seeking a job through social contacts can be found in Blau and
Robins (1990), Addison and Portugal (2002), and Sylos Labini (2004).– 6 –
(Montgomery 1991).
More generally, Simon and Warner (1992) assume that referrals ameliorate the noisy
information that ﬁrms have about new applicants’ true productivity. Building upon a stan-
dard matching model ` a la Jovanovic (1979), they show that referred job seekers set higher
reservation wages, given that they have less to gamble on provisional ﬁrms’ misperception
of their true productivity. Accordingly, the model implies that referred workers should earn
a higher initial wage, but thereafter should experience a lower wage increase compared to
non-referred ones.
Finally, Kugler (2003) suggests that, due to peer pressure in the workplace, employee
referrals lower monitoring costs and, therefore, ﬁrms hiring through referrals can pay lower
eﬃciency wages. She develops a model in which a dual matching process generates segmen-
tation in the labor market and referred workers get high paying jobs.
Most of the empirical works carried out in the U.S. have supported the above arguments
ﬁnding a positive association between the use of social contacts and either wages (Granovetter
1995; Corcoran el al. 1980; Simon and Warner 1992), or other indicators of job satisfaction
(Datcher 1983).5
On the other hand, other authors have found, manly in European countries, that us-
ing social networks yields on average lower salaries (Pistaferri 1999; Addison and Portugal
2002; Bentolila et al. 2004; Pellizzari 2004). A few explanations for this result have been put
forward. Pistaferri (1999) argues that the counterintuitive wage discount might stem either
from unobserved worker characteristics or from unobserved job ones (e.g. jobs reachable
through social networks are available only in small ﬁrms which pay lower wages). Granovet-
5Incidentally, in Datcher (1983) referrals improves the intensive margin of job seekers rather than em-
ployers.– 7 –
ter (1995) observes that, especially during recessions, people who rely on contacts are likely
to be the ones who are in great need of a job and/or do not have other options. Loury (2004),
using a simple model of job mobility, shows that lower wages can be caused by unobserved
heterogeneity stemming from this fact. In addition, the use of social ties can be a negative
signal for employers who might respond oﬀering a lower wage. Bentolila et al. (2004) go fur-
ther suggesting that contacts can induce a mismatch between one’s productive comparative
advantage and her occupational choice, given the higher search eﬃciency of informal search.
People using social contacts are thus expected to be on average less productive and therefore
earn lower wages. Finally, Pellizzari (2004) argues that employers’ search strategies (i.e. the
amount of resources invested in formal recruitment) are key to determine the relative eﬃ-
ciency of social contacts and therefore their eﬀect of on wages. He shows that in industries
where ﬁrms invest more in formal recruitment, wage premia paid to those who use social
networks are indeed lower and eventually negative.
The conﬂicting arguments and the contrasting evidence reviewed above rise, at least
partially, from the oversimpliﬁcation that is usually made modelling diﬀerent matching mech-
anisms and search behaviors: the variation in the circumstances in which people ﬁnd their
job through referrals is enormous and using social contacts is far from being a homogeneous
search method (Granovetter 1995). At least in principle, three issues should be considered
in order to improve both theoretical models and empirical analyses: (i) the nature of the
informal tie between the job seeker and the contact, (ii) the structural characteristics of the
network in which this tie is located6 and, (iii) the relation between this network and the
information about job opportunities and actors characteristics.
This paper concentrates on the ﬁrst matter. Social ties diﬀer across several dimensions:
ﬁrst, employee social referrals are believed to be mor informative than non-employee ones.
6See e.g. Calv´ o-Armengol and Jackson (2004).– 8 –
Second, the intensity of the relationship between the potential applicant and the contact
matters. For instance, both economists and sociologists have been inﬂuenced by Granovet-
ter’s hypothesis concerning the ”strength of weak ties”, which predicts that acquaintances
are often more informative than close friends and relatives in connecting people and jobs.7
Third, Granovetter (1995) in his seminal book also distinguishes among work and family-
social contacts.
Given the peculiarity of young university graduates and the features of our survey
data, we use a classiﬁcation similar to the last one, arguing that professional and family
contact are very diﬀerent job ﬁnding channels for the nature of the information they convey.
Consequentially, their impact on labor market outcomes is likely to diﬀer.
3. The Model
This section develops a two period model of a labor market with imperfect information
on workers’ productivity and other market frictions. Firms produce in both periods with
labor as the sole input; workers live only one period. The model has two basic features: ﬁrst,
a period-1 worker may have a social tie with a period-2 worker and, if this is the case, she
automatically refers her connection to her employer. Social contacts, thus, become relevant
in disclosing information in period 2 labor market. Second, the social tie connecting period-1
7To put it in a nutshell, although friends and relatives (Strong Ties) are probably more committed in
helping, acquaintances (Weak Ties) are more likely to convey useful information. They are in fact less likely
than close friends to know each other and therefore for structural reasons are more likely to have access
to useful and unexploited information about jobs openings. Boorman (1975) provides a very interesting
economic model, even if, given the structural assumptions he makes, the implications of it are diﬀerent form
Granovetter’s ones. See Bridges and Villemez (1986) for an empirical investigation and Montgomery (1992)
for a model which encompasses both economic and sociological insights.– 9 –
and period-2 workers can be twofold: either professional or family.
3.1. Assumptions and Timing
Workers are heterogeneous in two respect: their skills and the types of social ties they
hold. Firms set wages before observing both heterogeneities. The basic structure of the
model is similar to the one proposed by Montgomery (1991). The two novel features are:
ﬁrst, the twofold nature of social ties and, second, the presence of search costs which workers
have to bear unless they use their family connections.
3.1.1. Workers
It is assumed that in both periods there is a continuum of measure 1 of workers who, as
already mentioned, live only one period. For the sake of simplicity, they can be of two types:
high ability (H) workers produce an output equal to 1, while low ability (L) ones produce
0. We further assume that in each period half of workers are H (and half L) type. Workers
have a simple payoﬀ function which equals their wage minus the eventual search cost c they
might bear. Period-1 workers search for a job in the market, since in the ﬁrst stage of the
game ﬁrms are not able to exploit their connections. Conversely, period-2 workers might
either exploit their social contacts (if they receive any referral oﬀer), or seek for a job in
the market. Workers who exploit their family connections avoid to bear a search cost. The
assumption stems from the fact that relatives’ help is usually cheap to mobilize.8
3.1.2. Firms
Firms are identical but in the productivity of the worker they hire. Each ﬁrm employs
one worker in each period and its output equals her productivity. Goods and their price
8In the ﬁnal section of the paper we provide some pieces of evidence consistent this hypothesis.– 10 –
are identical and, to simplify, the latter is normalized to 1. Therefore, in each period ﬁrms’
proﬁt equals their sole worker’s productivity minus the wage oﬀered. In period 1 ﬁrms hire
through a competitive labor market taking the market wage wm1 as given. On the other
hand, in period 2, ﬁrms have the opportunity to make a referral oﬀer to their potential
period-1 worker’s connection. In either period ﬁrms are free to enter.
3.1.3. Social Structure
We assume an exogenous and stylized social structure. First, a period-1 worker (either
through a professional tie or through a family one) may be connected at most with one period-
2 worker. Thus, period-1 workers may have three possible states: professionally connected,
family connected, not connected. Accordingly, the multinomial distribution regulating the
above has two parameters: p, i.e. the probability that a period-1 worker has a professional
tie, and f, i.e. the probability that a period-1 worker has a family tie. Then 1 − p − f is
the probability a period-1 worker has no ties. Second, distinct stochastic processes govern
the twofold social structure. For practical purposes, we assume that social ties are assigned
sequentially, starting with professional ones:
• Professional Network
For each period-1 worker having a professional tie, the connected period-2 worker is
selected through a two stages stochastic process. First, a period-2 worker’s type is
chosen according to a key parameter: α > 1
2, i.e. the probability for a period-1 worker
to be connected to a period-2 worker of her own type, conditional upon holding a
professional tie. This assumption is crucial,9 because it allows ﬁrms to use professional
ties as a screening device. Second, a period-2 worker is randomly chosen, conditional
upon being of this type. Note that it is possible that a period-2 worker ends up being
9See Montgomery (1991) for a discussion on its empirical underpinnings.– 11 –
professionally connected to more than one period-1 worker.
• Family Network
For each period-1 worker holding a family tie, the connected period-2 worker is chosen
randomly and sequentially, given that she is not connected (neither professionally nor
family) to any other period-1 worker. This has two implications: ﬁrst, ﬁrms do not
learn anything about period-2 worker’s productivity out of knowing her period-1 rela-
tive’s productivity. Second, given the sequential selection, there is a one-to-one kinship
relation between workers in diﬀerent periods.10
Social structure is thus exogenously characterized by three parameters: two measures of
connectivity (p and f), and a measure of inbreeding among professionally connected workers
(α). The basic features of the two types of social ties addressed by the model are straight-
forward: ﬁrst, only professional contacts convey information concerning period-2 workers’
productivity. Second, family ties can be used in order to save search costs stemming from
various sorts of market frictions. Third, in period 2 ﬁrms might compete for the hiring of
professional connected workers, which are the only ones who may have more than one tie.11
3.1.4. Timing
In the ﬁrst period all workers are hired in the market which clears at wm1. Firms produce
and thereafter learn their worker’s productivity. Then, they may set referral oﬀers (family
(wF), professional (wP), or both (wF,wP)) and communicate such oﬀers to their period 1
10This last feature is key for our model, but may seem odd; in fact, it implies that period-2 workers might
have at most one family tie, while they might have several professional connections. However, it is conceived
for a reasonable purpose, i.e. to avoid that in period 2 ﬁrms compete to hire family connected workers.
11The allocation of professional ties, like in Montgomery (1991), resembles an occupancy problem in
probability theory: professional ties to period-1 workers are the balls randomly dropped in period-2 workers,
which are the urns. On the other hand, family ties are like balls which are dropped randomly in empty urns.– 12 –
employee. Consequently, according to the rules described in subsection 3.1.3, social ties are
assigned.12 At this point, each period-1 worker possessing either kind of tie automatically
passes the oﬀer to her period-2 relative or acquaintance. Finally, period-2 workers compare
the eventual oﬀers received13 and either accept one, or seek for a job in the market earning
the period 2 market wage (wm2). Every worker but the ones receiving and accepting a family
referral oﬀer incurs into a search cost equal to c.
3.2. Equilibrium
This section proves the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium with wage disper-
sion. Let us begin from stating two propositions that will be proven below concerning ﬁrms
strategies after the productivity of the period-1 worker have been observed.
Proposition 1 A ﬁrm makes a professional referral oﬀer if and only if it has employed a
H worker in period 1. Such oﬀer is dispersed over [wm2, ¯ wP], whose extremes will be derived
below as functions of the model parameters.
Proposition 2 All ﬁrms, regardless of the period-1 worker type they have hired, make family
referral oﬀers. Those oﬀers are set just a small  above (wm2 − c).
We consider now the equilibrium behavior of ﬁrms using information ﬂowing through profes-
sional networks starting from period 2. Proposition 1 guarantees that professional referral
oﬀers always exceed period 2 market wage. On the other hand, the assumption concerning
the social structure implies that a professionally connected period-2 worker may have more
12It may seem odd that ﬁrms make referral oﬀers before knowing if their period-1 worker is connected.
However, we can envisage this situation as an employer’s enquiry coupled with an oﬀer.
13Indeed, it should be clear at this point that only a few period-2 workers professionally connected might
receive more than one oﬀer.– 13 –
than one professional tie. Therefore, the generic ﬁrm i knows that the probability that a
period-2 H worker accept a professional referral oﬀer depends on the professional oﬀers made
by other j ﬁrms.
Pr{H accepts wPi} = Pr{H receives no oﬀer wPj > wPi, ∀j 6= i} .
Since it is assumed that each ﬁrm sets professional referral oﬀers independently randomiz-
ing over the equilibrium wage distribution F(·), following the derivations in Montgomery
(1991),14
Pr{H accepts wPi} = e
−αp[1−F(wPi)] .
Applying the same procedure, ﬁrm i also knows that if a professional referral oﬀer is made
to a L worker
Pr{L accepts wPi} = e
−(1−α)p[1−F(wPi)] .
Note that the reason why a L worker is more likely to accept a given wPi is that fewer ﬁrms
make her an oﬀer. This is due to Proposition 1 coupled with the inbreeding assumption
α > 1
2.
Recalling that free entry condition drives expected proﬁts of ﬁrms hiring in the market
to zero, we can now compute wm2. Therefore, in equilibrium period 2 market wages equals
workers’ expected productivity: a lower wage will foster further entry, a higher one will
cause negative expected proﬁts. Propositions 1 and 2 imply that a period-2 worker searches
in the market only if she has not received any professional referral oﬀer (which equals the
probability that accept wm2) multiplied by the probability that she has not received a family
referral oﬀer (in fact, according to Proposition 2, family oﬀer is an  better that getting the
best alternative wm2 −c). Therefore, we can write the probability of looking for a job in the
14In Montgomery (1991) it is also proved that the density of the professional referral oﬀer is positive over
the entire range [wm2, ¯ wP]. We give an implicit characterization of F(·) below.– 14 –
market for a worker with given productivity as
Pr{mkt|H} = Pr{H accepts (wm2)} · (1 − f)
Pr{mkt|L} = Pr{L accepts (wm2)} · (1 − f) .
Following Bayes’s rule we have that:
wm2 = Pr{H|mkt} =
e−αp
e−αp + e−(1−α)p . (1)
Note that, given α > 1
2 and p > 0, period-2 market wages are below average productivity
(wm2 < 1
2). Moreover, the denser is professional network (↑ p) and the higher is the inbreeding
bias (↑ α), the lower will be period 2 market wage (↓ wm2). On the other hand, neither f
nor c have any impact on wm2.
We can now compute ﬁrms’ payoﬀs in the case a professional oﬀer wP is made. Let us
ﬁrst consider a ﬁrm who employed a H worker in period-1.
EΠH(wP) = Pr{H period-2 is hired|wP} · (1 − wP) +
+Pr{L period-2 is hired|wP} · (−wP) . (2)
The probability of hiring a high ability period-2 worker, given a professional referral wP, is
Pr{H period-2 is hired|wP} = Pr{oﬀer made to H} × Pr{H accepts wP}
= αp · e
−αp[1−F(wP)],
and, similarly
Pr{L period-2 is hired|wP} = Pr{oﬀer made to L} × Pr{L accepts wP}
= (1 − α)p · e
−(1−α)p[1−F(wP)] .
Therefore, equation 2 can be written as
EΠH(wP) = αp · e
−αp[1−F(wP)](1 − wP) + (1 − α)p · e
−(1−α)p[1−F(wP)](−wP) . (3)– 15 –
In order for the above to be an equilibrium in mixed strategies, ﬁrms must earn the same
expected proﬁt ¯ π for any of the single referral wage oﬀers belonging to the support. Formally:
EΠH(wP) = ¯ π ∀wP ∈ [wm2, ¯ wP] .
It is now possible to express ¯ π as a function of the other parameters of the model. In fact,
if we plug wm2 in equation 3, holding expected proﬁts constant, we get
EΠH(wm2) = αp · e
−αp(1 − wm2)
+(1 − α)p · e
−(1−α)p(−wm2) = ¯ π .
Plugging in the expression for wm2 from equation 1
¯ π(α,p) =
p(2α − 1)
ep(1−α) + epα . (4)
This expression shows that, at the beginning of period 2, a ﬁrm employing a H worker in
period 1 and making a professional referral oﬀer (randomizing over the equilibrium wage
distribution F(·)) earns positive expected proﬁts. Since a ﬁrm hiring in the market earns
zero expected proﬁts, Proposition 1 is partly proved: a ﬁrms who employed a high ability
worker in period 1 makes a professional referral oﬀer.
Combining equation 3 and 4 we characterize F(·) implicitly as
αp · e
−αp[1−F(wP)](1 − wP) + (1 − α)p · e
−(1−α)p[1−F(wP)](−wP) =
p(2α − 1)
ep(1−α) + epα .
(5)
Moreover, plugging ¯ wP for wP and rearranging yields a solution for the upper bound of the
support over which F(·) is deﬁned:
¯ wP = α −








We now complete the proof of Proposition 1, showing that a ﬁrm who employed L
worker in period 1 does not make professional referral oﬀers. Its expected proﬁt is in fact
EΠL(wP) = (1 − α)p · e
−αp[1−F(wP)](1 − wP) + αp · e
−(1−α)p[1−F(wP)](−wP) .







Given that by construction
∂EΠH(wP)
∂wP = 0 for all wP ∈ [wm2, ¯ wP], the above implies
∂EΠL(wP)
∂wP <
0. Therefore, EΠL(wP) is maximized for wP = wm2. Substitution yields
EΠL(wP) =
e−p[1 − 2α]
e−pα + e−p(1−α) .
Since α > 1
2, the above expression is negative. Given that ﬁrms hiring in the market yield
zero proﬁt, it is proven that a ﬁrm hiring a L worker do not make a professional referral
oﬀer.
We can now move to prove Proposition 2. Given the hypothesis we made about fam-
ily network structure, ﬁrms do not gain any information about period-2 family connected
workers ability and therefore the expectations concerning their ability do not diﬀer from the
expectation they have on individuals who use the market.
Pr{H|family} = Pr{H|mkt} = wm2 .
Moreover, since period-2 workers family connected have the sole outside option to be hired in
the market bearing a search cost, ﬁrms’ oﬀers will be rejected if they are lower than wm2−c.
Therefore, we can write payoﬀs of ﬁrms making an ex-ante oﬀer to family connected workers
as




0 if wF ≤ wm2 − c
f · (wm2 − wF) if wF > wm2 − c .– 17 –
Rational ﬁrms will then set their oﬀers just an  above wm2 − c in order to maximize their
expected proﬁts that in turns will be
EΠH(wF) = EΠL(wF) = f · (c − ) .
Higher search costs on the labor market imply lower wages for family referred workers and
higher expected proﬁts for ﬁrms making such oﬀers.
Finally, we move back to consider the period 1 market. Free entry condition implies







· ¯ π(α,p) + f · (c − ) .
Period 1 market wage will therefore be increasing in c.
Summing up, the original features of the model (i.e. distinguishing among diﬀerent
social ties and assuming workers can save a search cost if they use family ties) imply that
family ties can be purposefully used by employers and workers even if they not convey any
information on workers’ abilities. Their use is proﬁtable for workers because it reduces
search costs. Consequently, knowing their outside options, ﬁrms can hiring them oﬀering
lower wages. It follows that the model makes two main predictions: ﬁrst, workers who
ﬁnd their job through informal professional referrals earn on average higher wages; second
workers who use the referral of their relatives earn lower wages. The ﬁrst prediction stems
from the role of professional social networks as a screening device; the second is the result
of the use of family connection as a way to economize on search costs.
4. The Data
We exploit the 1998 ISTAT (the Italian Bureau of Statistics) survey named Indagine
Inserimento Professionale Laureati (Survey on university-to-job transition). The survey has– 18 –
been run on a stratiﬁed sample of individuals who graduated approximately three years before
the survey took place.15 During 1998 a questionnaire was mailed to 25,716 individuals, which
represent 24.5 per cent of the entire population of 1995 university graduates. The response
rate was of 64.7 per cent, for a total of 17,326 respondents. Among them only 12,418
considered themselves employed. Since self-employed (4,160) are not technically hired, we
exclude them together with individuals who are enrolled in formal graduate education (692),
and individuals who did not answer the questions concerning wage, hours worked, or province
of work (1,252). The ﬁnal sample is therefore composed by 6,314 employed graduates.
The survey questionnaire collects information concerning (i) school and university cur-
ricula, (ii) employment (or unemployment) conditions, and (iii) demographics and family
backgrounds. Key for our purposes is a subset of questions related to job-ﬁnding methods.
First, employed individuals are asked: ”How did you ﬁnd your actual job?”. Together with
direct application, newspaper ads, public exam, state employment service, the respondent
may choose ”A relative, a friend, or an acquaintance referred me to my employer”. Second,
if the latter method has been used, individuals are asked about the identity of the refer-
ral. In particular, we know if she is a relative and her professional role. Thus, beyond the
aggregate set of people who have used social contacts (NET), it is possible to deﬁne two
not overlapping subsets: the one composed by individuals who have exploited their family
contacts (FAM) and the one grouping individuals who have been referred by non relatives
who hold the same professional role (PROF). We also deﬁne a third residual subset, named
(RES), which groups workers that found employment being referred neither by relatives nor
by people having their professional role. The Appendix reproduces the key questions asked
in the questionnaire together with a detailed descriptions of the procedure followed.
15The one stage stratiﬁcation process takes into consideration sex, geographical location of the university
attended, and degree obtained. All the estimates are performed using survey weights.– 19 –
Table 2: Sample Characteristics of the Data




Monthly Wage 1,994 8.26
Weekly Hours Worked 36.99 0.11
Age 30 0.052
High School Grade 49 0.092
Female .498 .006
Public Sector 0.298 .006
Number of obs. 6314
Notes: Wages are expressed in thousands of Italian Lira. High school grades range from 36 to 60.
The subsets FAM and PROF are the empirical counterparts of the two types of social
ties described by our model.
Table 2 depicts weighted means and standard errors of dependent and independent
variables of our analysis. Almost 30% per cent of individuals in our sample have found their
job through social referrals. Using the 1991 data from Bank of Italy survey, if one focuses
on university graduates, one gets a number similar to ours (25%).
5. Who ﬁnds job through personal contact
Table 3 depicts the shares of individuals who used diﬀerent channels (total informal
referrals, family and professional) within distinct geographical areas, diﬀerent university
degree and ﬁrms with distinct sizes. First, major diﬀerences reside in distinct kinds of
referrals used rather than in the aggregate percentage. The South is at the same time the
region where family connections are more pervasive—as the common wisdom suggests—
and where professional ties are less used; the remaining areas show by and large similar– 20 –
percentages.
Second, diﬀerent university degrees also show diﬀerent patterns: engineering graduates
rely relatively little on family contacts and are more likely to ﬁnd a job through direct
application.16 Probably, this is due to the more precise skill content of engineers’ occupations
and the selectivity of the program: their degree provides more speciﬁc skills than other
disciplines. The opposite seems to be true for the Humanities and Economics and Business,
who often use their family contacts.
Third, as found in other investigations (Granovetter 1995; Pistaferri 1999; Ioannides
and Loury 2005), among the workers employed in smaller ﬁrms a higher share relies on
informal ties. A plausible explanation is that only big ﬁrms have economies of scale in
their recruitment processes that allow them to aﬀord formal recruitment departments and
practices. In any case, the ﬁgure raises some doubts concerning the eﬃciency for employers
of recruiting through informal ties, assumed irrespectively of ﬁrms’ dimensions.
To further document the characteristics of the individuals who used the three informal
networks deﬁned, we estimate with OLS three simple linear probability models in order.
The dependent dichotomous variables assume therefore value 1 if the respondent get her job
through overall social referrals, family referral, and professional referral respectively. The
set of controls includes age, a sex dummy (female=1), high school grade,17 the educational
levels of both parents (ranging from 1, without formal education, to 7, university degree),
provincial GDP per capita expressed in millions of Lira, a dummy for public employment
16The percentage concerning individuals using direct application are available from the author upon re-
quest.
17Other measures of school performance are available: university grade and distinctions. Nevertheless those
indicators are less informative (around 25% of Italian graduates get the highest mark) and less exogenous
with respect to occupational outcomes.– 21 –
Table 3: Social Referrals Job Finding Rates: Shares Among Distinct Subgroups.
Total Informal Family Professional
University Geographic Location
North West .284 .072 .077
(.010) (.006) (.006)
North East .293 .075 .080
(.015) (.009) (.009)
Center .290 .076 .077
(.009) (.005) (.005)
South .296 .115 .064
(.013) (.009) (.007)
University Degree
Engineering .277 .057 .084
(.012) (.006) (.008)
Science .318 .072 .106
(.013) (.007) (.009)
Economics, Business and Statistics .288 .099 .065
(.011) (.007) (.006)
Low and Political Sciences .250 .082 .047
(.015) (.010) (.007)
Humanities .291 .098 .065
(.013) (.008) (.007)
Firm size
Over 100 employees .268 .071 .073
(.006) (.005) (.005)
Below or equal 100 employees .371 .105 .093
(.010) (.006) (.006)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis.– 22 –
Table 4: Determinants of job ﬁnding methods
Total Informal Family Professional
Age .001 (.001) .002 (.003) .001 (.001)
Female .004 (.012) .007 (.003) .001 (.007)
High School Grade -.003∗∗∗ (.001) -.002∗∗∗ (.001) -.0003 (.001)
Mother Education .002 (.004) .005∗ (.003) -.001 (.002)
Father Education .011∗∗ (.004) .008∗∗∗ (.003) -.001 (.002)
GDP .001 (.001) -.001 (.001) .001∗ (.001)
Public Employment -.146∗∗∗ (.016) -.041∗∗∗ (.010) -.045∗∗∗ (.008)
Dummies for province Yes Yes Yes
Dummies for degree Yes Yes Yes
Dummies for ﬁrm dimension Yes Yes Yes
R squared 0.085 0.054 0.041
Notes: 6314 Observations. Weighted OLS estimation of linear probability models with standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variables assume
value 1 if the individual has used one of the speciﬁed job ﬁnding method. ∗ signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗. signiﬁcant at 1%.
(public employment=1),18 6 dummies for ﬁrm size, 103 dummies for province of residence
before college enrollment, 58 dummies for university degree.
Results for most controls are reported in Table 4. The probability of ﬁnding a job
through personal contacts is negatively correlated with school performance and positively
with more educated family background. The same pattern holds clearly for jobs found
through family contacts (both parents level education is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero).
On the other hand, the coeﬃcients capturing social background and school performance are
not signiﬁcant for the regression concerning the use of professional tie.
The suggested picture is extremely interesting: uneven access to useful informal net-
works (i.e. diﬀerent socio-economic status) is positively correlated with the actual use of
social contacts; moreover, more proﬁcient students are less likely to use such networks. Both
18We add this control, given that most public jobs are ﬁlled through public exams.– 23 –
Table 5: Averages hourly wages for workers who used diﬀerent job ﬁnding methods
Formal means Total Informal Family Professional
Mean St. Error Mean St. Error Mean St. Error Mean St. Dev.
Wage 13.31 .102 12.71 .171 12.64 .382 13.77 .420
Number of obs. 4484 1830 520 473
Notes: Hourly Wages are expressed in thousands of Italian Lira. Both means and standard errors are weighted.
pieces of evidence do not hold for professional contacts. If high school grade is a good mea-
sure for skills or ability, the above result is consistent with one of the implications of our
model: individual using professional ties being more skilled than the ones using family ones.
6. Social networks and wages
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics concerning hourly wages earned by workers who
have found their job using diﬀerent channels. In line with the prediction of our model, wages
are on average lower among workers who used family social ties and higher for the ones who
used professional social ties with respect to the ones who used formal means. Of course, this
result is preliminary, since it does not control for several dimensions.
The ﬁrst step of our analysis is to check if wages are correlated with the use of informal
referrals. We estimate with OLS technique the following standard wage model
log(wi) = β0 + β1NETi + x
0
iπ + εi , (7)
where wi in the neat hourly wage, NETi is a dummy variables which equals 1 if the individual
i get her present job through a social referral (and 0 otherwise), and xi is a set of individual– 24 –
controls:19 high school grade, dummies for levels of father and mother education20 and
sex, age, pro capita provincial GDP (expressed in millions of Lira), dummies for province of
residence before university enrolment,21 university degree and public sector employment, and
a constant. In the ﬁrst column of Table 6 we report coeﬃcients of our regression: workers
who use social ties earn 2.5 percent lower wages. Our result is qualitatively similar to the
one found in Pistaferri (1999).22
In a second speciﬁcation (see column 2) we distinguish between Family and Professional
ties use adding three diﬀerent dummies, FAM, PROF, RES in place of NET,
log(wi) = β0 + β1FAMi + β2PROFi + β3RESi + x
0
iπ + εi . (8)
It turns out that the coeﬃcients have opposite signs and are both statistically signiﬁcant.
Consistently with the prediction of our model, family contacts are associated with a wage
discount of roughly 5.6 per cent and professional ones with a wage premium of 4.4. All the
remaining controls have the expected signs.
Given the positive association between parental education and the use of family ties
19In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation regressors which are likely to be caused by the use of informal networks (e.g.
dummies for size of the employer and occupation) are not included.
20This control is important not only because, as argued by Pistaferri (1999), it can proxy for unobserved
ability, but also because it is an indicator for the endowment and quality of social resources which may aﬀect
wages through channels diﬀerent from referrals.
21This is the geographical control which is less likely to be endogenous (compared to university and
employment location).
22According to his study, 1991 wage discount associated with the use of informal networks ranges from
4.5, without ﬁrms size controls, to 3 per cent. When occupational and ﬁrm size controls are added, our
coeﬃcient drops to .022 but are still signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Results can be obtain from the author
upon request.– 25 –
Table 6: Social networks use and wages
(1) (2) (3)
NET -.025∗∗∗ (.009) ... ...
FAM ... -.056∗∗∗ (.015) -.142∗∗∗ (.045)
PROF ... .044∗∗∗ (.016) .044∗∗∗ (.016)
RES ... -.045∗∗∗ (.011) -.046∗∗∗ (.011)
FAM*family education ... ... .020∗∗ (.009)
Age .009∗∗∗ (.001) .009∗∗∗ (.001) .006∗∗∗ (.001)
Female -.071∗∗∗ (.008) -.071∗∗∗ (.008) -.063∗∗∗ (.008)
Experience .050∗∗∗ (.005) .050∗∗∗ (.005) .050∗∗∗ (.005)
High School grade .003∗∗∗ (.001) .003∗∗∗ (.001) .002∗∗∗ (.001)
Public Employment .141∗∗∗ (.010) .141∗∗∗ (.010) .141∗∗∗ (.010)
GDP .003∗∗∗ (.001) .003∗∗∗ (.001) .003∗∗∗ (.001)
Dummies for province Yes Yes Yes
Dummies for parents’ education Yes Yes Yes
Dummies for degree Yes Yes Yes
Dummies for size and occupation No No No
R-Squared .155 .160 .161
Notes: 6314 observations. Weighted OLS estimation with standard errors in parenthesis. (1) Only NET and no ﬁrm size and occupation
dummies; (3) FAM and PROF with without ﬁrm size and occupational dummies;. (4) An additional regressor added: the interaction of FAM
with average parents education.
∗ signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
(Table 4), we also expect that people with diﬀerent social background beneﬁt diﬀerently from
the use family contacts. To test this hypothesis, the third speciﬁcation of the model allows
the wage discount associated with the use of family contact to be diﬀerent for individuals
with distinct social backgrounds: we interact the dummy FAM with the parents’ average
educational level.23 Results are depicted in column 3. The coeﬃcient has a positive sign
and is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, suggesting that the negative association
between the use of family network and wages become weaker for individuals having more
favorable social background. According to our estimates, wage discounts range from zero to
23As in the previous section, this variable ranges from 1, no formal education, to 7, university degree.– 26 –
more than ten percent for individuals with diﬀerent social backgrounds. This results suggests
that even within the group using family ties one wants to distinguish for the quality of the
contact.
7. Is the use of social ties the real cause of wage diﬀerentials?
Interpreting the coeﬃcients depicted above as causal eﬀects is of course problematic.
First, the (positive and negative) associations between distinct social referrals and wages
may stem from job speciﬁc characteristics which are proxied by the social contact use. For
instance, it is well known that smaller ﬁrms pay lower wages and, as shown in Table 3,
informal methods are more likely to be used by workers employed in those ﬁrms.
Second, graduates that use social contacts are likely to diﬀer along important and un-
observed aspects: individuals having access to useful connections may have common charac-
teristics beyond the observed ones that aﬀect wages; moreover, the actual24 exploitation of
them can be correlated with other unobservables like personal motivations or abilities which
are not captured by school performance indicator and are likely to have an eﬀect on wages.
For instance, if one plausibly assumes that less ambitious and motivated graduates are more
likely to exploit their family connections, lower wages may be caused by those personal traits
rather than the use of contacts. In this case the FAM coeﬃcient reported in the previous
section would be upward biased in absolute terms overestimating the negative eﬀect.
We try to mitigate the ﬁrst problem controlling for job characteristics. Pistaferri (1999),
for instance, ﬁnds that when ﬁrms size is controlled for the negative association between
contacts use and wages halves. In the same vein, in a fourth speciﬁcation of our model we
24See the interesting discussion in Montgomery (1992), who rightly warns on the subtle diﬀerence between
having a connection and using it to get a job.– 27 –
Table 7: Social networks use and wages: robustness checks
(1) (2)
FAM -.047∗∗∗ (.031) ...
PROF .025∗ (.011) .044∗∗∗ (.016)
RES -.028∗∗∗ (.006) -045∗∗∗ (.011)
FAM*SOUTH ... -.100∗∗∗ (.015)
FAM*CENTRE-NORTH ... -.040∗∗∗ (.040)
Age .006∗∗∗ (.001) .009∗∗∗ (.001)
Female .006∗∗∗ (.001) .071∗∗∗ (.008)
Experience .028∗∗∗ (.005) .050∗∗∗ (.005)
High School grade .0015∗∗∗ (.0005) .003∗∗∗ (.001)
Public Employment .105∗∗∗ (.012) .141∗∗∗ (.010)
GDP .003∗∗∗ (.001) .003∗∗∗ (.001)
Dummies for province Yes Yes
Dummies for parents’ education Yes Yes
Dummies for degree Yes Yes
Dummies for size and occupation Yes No
R-Squared .271 .161
Notes: 6314 observations. Weighted OLS estimation with standard errors in parenthesis. (1) Firm size and occupational dummies included; (2)
FAM broken down according to the region of university attended; ∗ signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
add a few additional job speciﬁc controls: 6 dummies for distinct classes of ﬁrms size, 42 for
distinct occupations, 1 for temporary contract, 1 for part time jobs, 1 for jobs started before
graduation, and 1 for jobs without a registered contract. Although those regressors might
bias our estimates (e.g. networks themselves channel individuals into occupations and ﬁrms
which are more likely to pay lower wages), they control for possible job speciﬁc aspects which
might be the true cause for lower wages. As depicted in column 1 of Table 7, the coeﬃcients
for family and professional contact drop respectively to -0.047 and 0.025, with the latter
only marginally statistically diﬀerent from zero. Nevertheless, their signs still support the
implications of our model.
The second problem (i.e. individual unobsevables) is more subtle to control for and is– 28 –
particularly severe for the interpretation of the coeﬃcient concerning family ties: why should
identical graduates use their family connections if they cause lower wages? According to our
model this stems from the beneﬁt they get from not incurring search costs. We therefore
try to check if our empirical results are consistent with other implications of our model. In
particular, ﬁrst, wage discount associated with the use of family connections should increases
with market friction and search costs. Second, if we were able to measure search costs, we
would ﬁnd a negative association between them and the use of family ties.
It is a well known fact that Italian labor market works very diﬀerently in distinct
regions. In particular, unemployment in the south is much higher and this is likely to imply
higher search costs. If our explanation is correct, one should therefore observe higher wage
discount stemming from family connections for university graduates of southern regions.
In column 2 of Table 7 we report the results the same model estimated in the previous
section substituiting NET with two distinct dummies: FAM*SOUTH for individuals who
had attended university in the south and have used family contacts and FAM*CENTRE-
NORTH. Wage discount associated with family contacts use is, in fact, more than twice
bigger for southern graduates.
Unfortunately actual search costs aﬀorded by graduates are diﬃcult to observe. Nev-
ertheless, our data set provides a reasonably good proxy: the monthly time lag between
graduation date and the beginning of the actual job (Length).25 However, individual are not
asked about the channels used to ﬁnd their ﬁrst job, but only their actual one; therefore
we reﬁne our sample considering only those 2,451 workers who are in their ﬁrst occupation
and did not start their job before the end of university.26 For those individuals the following
25Unfortunately the survey does not ask if individuals have actively searched for a job during such period.
26Our estimates might be biased if selection into our sub-sample were systematically correlated with
unobservables that aﬀect Length. We also estimate the same model for the entire sample assuming that– 29 –
model is estimated:
Lengthi = ηFAMi + γPROFi + σRESi + x
0
iπ + εi . (9)
The controls xi include high school grade, dummies for levels of father and mother
education and sex, age, pro capita provincial GDP, dummies for province of residence before
university enrolment and kind of degree, a dummy for having done the military service after
graduation27 and for public employment, and a constant. According to OLS estimates, as
depicted in Table 8, the use of family ties is associated with around 1.7 months shorter jobless
status after graduation. The negative association with other informal job ﬁnding method
is smaller and not signiﬁcant. This piece of evidence is consistent with our model: people
exploiting family connections are likely to tradeoﬀ higher wages for less costly search.28
To conclude, we show with some rough calculations that, according to the above, the
decision of exploiting one’s family connection is not so irrational as it might seem. In fact,
to simplify, if one takes 5% as a realistic measure of the wage discount stemming from the
use of family contacts and one considers an approximate monthly wage of 2 millions of lira,
the monthly loss from using one’s family contact would be of 100 thousands lira. On the
other hand, if one takes for good the above estimates of extra 1.7 months of jobless status,
a graduate who decides not to use her family ties incurs in a monetary loss of 3.4 millions
(without considering additional job search costs). Therefore, it takes about 35.7 months to
earn the same amount of money of someone who had decided to exploit her family connections
for someone who has decided not to do so. In such period of time wages are likely to adjust
individuals who are not in their ﬁrst job have used the same method to ﬁnd their ﬁrst occupation. We
obtain the same qualitative results, which are available from the author upon request.
27Military service lasted about 12 months and was compulsory for Italian males.
28Incidentally, this result is also consistent with the matching model proposed by Bentolila et al. (2004)
in which time is explicitly considered.– 30 –







High School Grade -0.02 (.031)
Military Service 10.11∗∗∗ (522)
Dummies for province Yes
Dummies for parents’ education Yes
Dummies for degree Yes
R-Squared .146
Notes: 2451 observations. The dependent variable is expressed in number of months. Weighted OLS estimation with standard errors in
parenthesis. ∗ signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
towards one’s productivity and exploiting one’s family connection may be proﬁtable.
8. Conclusions
The present paper addressed the importance of distinct social networks in the labor
market, focussing on the case of young Italian workers with tertiary education. First, we
argued that some of the so far controversial results obtained in the economic literature can
stem from an oversimpliﬁed idea of informal search methods in the labor market. Second, a
formal model which distinguishes among two diﬀerent social ties was presented. Third, new
empirical evidence largely consistent with such model was obtained exploiting a relatively
unexploited data set.
The model, which draws on Montgomery (1991), shown that two distinct social ties
can be used to overcome diﬀerent information imperfections in the labor market. Employers
use professional ties in order to reduce the uncertainty concerning new workers’ ability. On– 31 –
the other hand, family contacts lower search costs in markets where frictions undermine the
location of job opportunities.
Focussing on Italian graduate students, we found that diﬀerent matching mechanisms
correlate with geography, school performances, and social backgrounds. Moreover, the chan-
nels through which graduates ﬁnd their jobs are aﬀected by educational performance and
are likely to be embedded in social backgrounds. Most importantly, the implications of our
concerning the wage diﬀerentials associated with the two kinds of social networks use were
also tested. A standard wage regression model shown that the use of professional networks
is associated with a wage premium, while the opposite is true for the use of family networks.
The results are to a large extent conﬁrmed controlling for job speciﬁc characteristics. We
also found, consistently with the insights of the model, that graduates using family contacts
are likely to experience shorter jobless status.
This paper has oﬀered two kinds of contributions to the literature. First, we argued that
distinguishing between formal and informal job ﬁnding methods is not enough. More subtle
mechanisms stand behind the use of distinct social networks and in particular, the nature
of the tie matters. Second, we shed light on the puzzling results found in the literature
concerning the impact of the use of social referrals on wages.
Appendix
In this section we simply report the translated key-section of the questionnaire used in
the survey end give detailed explanation on how we deﬁne the Net, Fam and Prof dummies.
58. How did you get your job?
2 Through a referral made to my employer by relatives/friends/acquaintances (Pass to
question 60)
2 Through direct knowledge of my employer– 32 –
2 Through a referral made by University, training centers, or Faculties
2 After an internship
2 By a direct call of my employer
2 Through newspaper ads.
2 Sending my CV to my employer
2 Public exam
2 By starting a job as self employed
2 Through application to schools or education institutes
2 Through Public Employment agency
2 Through private employment agencies




2 Helped me to prepare the exam
2 Lend me money
2 Gave me tools/machineries
2 Was the intermediary with my employer
2 Gave me information which has been crucial to get the job.
60. Was he/she:
2 A parent
2 Your brother or sister
2 Another relative– 33 –
2 Someone else
61. Which was his professional role?
2 Self-employed
2 Manager
2 Professor or researcher
2 Technician or qualiﬁed employees (data analyst, accountant)
2 Clerical worker
We assign value 1 to the dummy NET if one of the following conditions hold:
• Answer to question 58 is
”Through a referral made to my employer by relatives/friends/acquaintances” or
”Through direct knowledge of my employer”;
• Answer to question 59 is
”Yes, someone who was the intermediary with my employer” or
”Yes, someone who gave me information which has been crucial to get the job”.
In turn, ﬁrst, if NET = 1 and answer to question 60 is ”A parent”, ”Your brother or sister”,
or ”A relative” we assign value one to the dummy FAM; second, if answer to 60 is ”Someone
else” and the professional role indicated in question 61 is the same of the respondent one we
assign value one to the dummy PROF.
Notice that the two subset are not overlapping and do not induce a complete partition
of NET, given that some respondents have been referred by a non relative with diﬀerent
professional role.– 34 –
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